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Rules, Institutions, Transformations. 
Considerations on the "Evolution of Law" Paradigm*
by
MASSIMO LA TORRE
Contents : 1. Concepts of Law. A Proposal - 2. Evolutionary
Concepts - 3. Neo-evolutionary theories - 4. Evolution as
Learning - 5. Law as autopoiesis - 6. Towards a Critique of the 
"Evolution of Law" Paradigm -
1. Concepts of Law. A Proposal
In recent years there has been a rebirth of evolutionary 
conceptions of law, as regards both the ontology of law and the 
explanatory methodology of contemporary legal phenomena. One may 
accordingly speak of of a paradigm of "evolution of law", using 
the term "paradigm" in Thomas Kuhn's sense. I wish below briefly 
(perhaps too briefly) to discuss this paradigm. My considerations 
are divided into six sections.
First, I feel it needful to offer a definition - albeit 
approximate - of the concept of law. In my opinion, the law 
cannot be reduced to a series of mandates or imperatives, nor to 
a mere system of norms, nor to regularities of conduct, nor to 
functions of a reality of a natural, objective type, that is, to 
a set of "crude facts". The first position is the one defended
These notes reproduce, with changes and additions, the 
texts of two lectures given at the Universities of Valencia and 
La Laguna (Tenerife) in December 1991 and May 1992 respectively, 
and of some seminars given at the European University Institute 




























































































by the voluntarist or imperativist theoreticians, such as for 
instance Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, though they too 
introduce elements that in one way or another limit their 
voluntarism and imperativism (I am thinking, for instance, of 
Austin's idea of legal rules as abstract mandates, that is, as 
acts that lay down classes of conduct rather than specific 
conduct).
The second position belongs to the so-called normativists, whose 
most typical representative is Hans Kelsen, while the third 
position is that of legal realism, particularly in its American 
version. The last position is that of legal sociology, or rather 
of many sociological theories that study law as a phenomenon of 
social reality, seen as a framework of natural, empirical 
reality.
I wish to bring out some of the reasons why I am not in agreement 
with any of the theories mentioned.
Law is not a sum of mandates or imperatives. A mandate or 
imperative acts interpersonally and its validity depends on the 
(phycical and/or psychological) power of the subject issuing it. 
Law and legal norms are, however, eminently impersonal phenomena. 
Legal norms continue to be valid even when the subjects that 
issued them are dead. Sometimes they are even valid and in force 
though the subjects that are their addressees are unaware of 
their existence, that is, do not know that anyone has issued 
those norms.
Like Jurgen Habermas, I am not convinced of this central thesis 
of so-called "prescriptivism", namely that "in the logical 
structuring of discourse, imperatives must take primacy over 
rules of conduct1. "The meaning of the universal validity claim,"
1 J . HABERMAS, Zwei Bemerkunaen zum praktischen Diskurs. 
Paul Lorenzen zum 60. Geburtstag. in idem. Zur Rekonstruktion des 





























































































claim," continues the Frankfurt philosopher, "the claim to 
normative validity, associated with norms of action can 
adequately be analysed only in terms of intersubjective 
recognition and not in terms of generalized commands"2. "An 
order or request," writes Carlos Nino, "are acts of formulating 
normative judgements with the intention that this formulation be 
relevant for the reasons the addressee already has"3. In order 
for an order, a mandate, a prescription, an imperative, to be 
effective, the addressee must have reasons preceding formulation 
of the order, which can accordingly not be founded on the order 
itself. The fact that I am an addressee of a prescription cannot, 
on pain of falling into the naturalist fallacy, justify my 
decision to obey the prescription itself. In order for it to have 
normative validity, and be able to guide my action, one must 
assume a normative principle stating that a certain normative 
formulation, in certain frameworks and contexts, and issued by 
certain persons, has the value of a rule of conduct.
Furthermore, imperativism has to assume a semantic theory that 
is very questionable. In the first place, for prescriptivism 
rules have a meaning, a semantic content, only to the extent that 
they have been the object of an action of promulgation, of will, 
of the prescriptive use of language. This is the so-called 
"expressive" conception of norms4. In the second place, 
imperativism must assume an "intentionalist" theory of language, 
according to which the meaning of a statement (and a fortiori of 
a rule) is the "intention" of the person issuing it5. Thus, in
2 Ibid.
3 C.S. NINO, El constructivismo ético. Centro de estudios 
constitucionales, Madrid 1989, p. 54.
4 See C. ALCHOURRON, E. BULYGIN, The Expressive Conception 
of Norms. in New Essays in Deontic Logic, ed. by R. Hilpinen, 
Reidel, Dordrecht 1981, pp. 95 ff.
5 For H.P. Grice, one of the defenders of the intentionalist 
theory, a linguistic expression x means p, if (i) there is an 
intention by the utterer of x that x should mean p, (ii) there 
exists the recognition or the possibility of recognition by the 




























































































order to understand and interpret the norm-mandate, one must 
identify a human subject that is its issuer. These two theses of 
the theory of meaning may be objected to prima facie on the 
ground that "expressivism" is an obstacle to a logical and 
rational reconstruction of the legal decision6 and that 
"intentionalism" is an obstacle to any process of interpreting 
the rule (the law) that does not have as its direct aim the 
assertion of the subjective, historical will of the subject that 
laid down the rule (the legislator)7 Despite what Carlos 
Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin aver8, "expressivism" has many
(iii) there is the intention by the utterer of x that p be 
recognized as its meaning (see H.P. GRICE, Meaning. in 
"Philosophical Review", 1957, pp. 377-388).
6 For a critique of the "expressive conception" of rules, 
see 0. WEINBERGER, Per normenloaische Skeptizismus. in 
"Rechtstheorie", 1986, pp. 45 ff.
7 This difficulty is seen by Grice, who however believes 
that in some way any meaning can refer to a particular intention. 
Thus, after having distinguished between "natural meaning" 
(meaning N) - more or less close to what is understood in 
linguistics by the "sign", where the fact that x means p implies 
p - and the "non-natural meaning" (meaning NN) - more or less 
close to what "in linguistics would be called "symbol", where the 
fact that x means p does not imply p, the English philosopher 
defines the concept of "non natural-meaning" (meaning NN) as 
follows: "'X meant something' is (roughly) equivalent to 
'somebody meantNN something by x'. Here again there will be cases 
where this will not quite work. I feel inclined to say that (as 
regards traffic lights) the change to red meantNN that the 
traffic was to stop; but it would be very unnatural to say, 
'somebody (e.g., the Corporation) meantNN by the redlight change 
that the traffic was to stop'. Nevertheless■ there seems to be 
some wsort of reference to somebody's intentions" (H.P. GRICE, 
op.cit.. p. 385, my emphasis).
8 "The [expressive] theory is easily adaptable to customary 
norms. Its existence depends on certain provisions revealed in 
particular actions" (C. ALCHOURRON, E. BULYGIN, La concepcién 
expresiva de las normas■ in idem. Anàlisis léaico v derecho. 
Centro de estudios constitucionales, Madrid 1991, p. 127). But 
if it is affirmed that "norms are the result of the prescriptive 
use of language" (ibid., p. 123, emphasis in original), it will 
be necessary to conclude that customary norms, which are not the 
result of any use of language (and a fortiori any prescriptive 
use of language), are not "true" norms. The "provisions revealed 




























































































problems with explaining implicit rules, which even in the legal 
experience of the modern State play a fundamental part (for 
instance, as regards customary norms, case law and the general 
principles of law, all of them based on sets of rules not 
explicitly laid down). Ultimately, what imperativism forgets is, 
as Waismann says, that "a command necessarily presupposes a 
commander, a rule does not"5.
The law is not a mere system of rules, insofar as the norms are 
regarded as ideal entities, semantic contents, which as such do 
not need the fact of being observed. Each of us may mentally 
enunciate or make a list or a draft of a complete system of 
norms, a new penal code for example, without these norms being 
able to direct human conduct nor to constitute a truly legal 
phenomenon. Considering the difference between draft laws and 
actual laws. It may thus be stated with a fair degree of 
certainty that a norm manages to be a real (social) phenomenon 
instead of remaining just a semantic entity (however elaborate 
and theoretically interesting) once the conduct of the subjects 
to whom the norm is addressed or are in some way affected by it 
starts to conform with the norm. As Wittgenstein writes, "the 
arrow strikes only when used by the living being"* 10. This does 
not mean that the laws do not present themselves as systems of 
semantic entities. All it means is that the laws are also 
semantic entities, but in order to be socially existing norms, 
they need to be applied, that is, there has to be conduct 
corresponding to them or - if as Uberto Scarpelli suggested to 
us we take up Richard Mervin Hare's ideas - to their "phrastic", 
their semantic element that represents a certain state of 
affairs. What is being rejected here is only a more or less
prescriptions or orders.
5 F. WAISMANN, Loqik, Sprache, Philosophie, ed. by G.P.
Baker and B. McGuinness, Reclam, Stuttgart 1976, p. 209.
10 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophische Untersuchunqen. Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 1984, p. 208 (I, 454), cf. A. KEMMERLING, Regel 
und Geltunq im Lichte der Analyse Wittgensteins, in 




























































































idealist or "platonist" normativism. This rejection does not 
imply that a position, that I regard as plausible enough, that 
has been called "realist normativism" cannot be taken up. It 
emphasizes interdependence among norms as semantic entities (or 
ideal ones if you like) and conduct, in the constitution of legal 
phenomena.
Nor does the law consist of regularities of conduct, since the 
fact that a piece of behaviour is constantly repeated over time 
neither indicates nor is the cause of that conduct's having to 
continue being repeated. The fact that I get up every day at 
seven in the morning does not prove the existence of a rule that 
I am obliged to get up every morning at such a barbarous hour. 
“The fact that a rule is followed" writes Waismann, "is something 
one can convince oneself of only by actually observing the 
movements involved. The validity of the rule is independent of 
such observations"11. Moreover, rules, by contrast with 
regularities, also deal with new cases, so that an agent 
following a rule may have an indication "what to do" even in 
situations that have never happened before12.
Human conduct, people's actions, are not guided by a mechanical 
type of causality. Human conduct is motivated by intentions, and 
can be justified by reasons. Accordingly, in law, and in general 
in any normative phenomenon, the internal viewpoint, the 
viewopoint of the agent taking certain norms as bases for 
actions, prevails over the external viewpoint, that is, the 
viewpoint of someone merely considering the cause of certain 
behaviour and its possible conformity with certain rules or 
norms. Were the internal viewpoint not considered, Saul Kripke 
might be right in his sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
thought to the effect that any rule might be in accordance with 
any conduct, and accordingly it would not even be logically
11 F. WAISMANN, Logik, Sprache. Philosophie. cit., p. 211.
12 See ibid., p. 209; cf. J.R. SEARLE, Speech Acts, An Essay 
in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 




























































































possible to speak of breach of a rule. In fact, without 
considering the internal viewpoint, much conduct might correspond 
negatively (as a breach) or positively (as compliance) with a 
particular set of rules or norms.
As Carlos Nino tells us, "if the legal norm is a reason to act, 
it cannot be an act or a fact without there having to be a 
judgement or a principle"13. If we accept the idea that norms 
are reasons for adopting particular conduct, and distinguish 
among causes, motives and reasons14, we have to conceive of 
norms as semantic contents, as normative propositions that may 
take on the rule of major premises in practical reasoning. The 
imperativist conceptions (according to which norms are acts of 
will) and the realist theories (according to which norms are 
facts, without further qualification) deny the ideal, semantic 
or propositional, element in legal norms. These can accordingly 
constitute only causes or grounds for conduct, but never reasons 
to act in a particular way or manner. From an imperativist or 
realist viewpoint, there is not much point in talking of 
practical reason.
The internal aspect of judgements, desires, beliefs, norms, that 
is, their propositional or semantic content, is logically prior 
to their internal aspect, that is, their causal relevance, their 
capacity to be causes of other facts in the world, insofar as
13 C.S. NINO, El constructivismo ètico■ cit., p. 30.
14 For this distinction, cf. F. WAISMANN, Language Strata. 
in Logic and Language. (Second Series), ed. by A. Flew, 
Blackwell, Oxford 1973, pp. 30-31. And see L. WITTGENSTEIN, The 
Blue Book, in idem. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell, London 
1989, p. 15: "The proposition that your action has such and such 
a cause, is a hypothesis. The hypothesis is well-founded if one 
has had a number of experiences which, roughly speaking, agree 
in showing that your action is the regular sequel of certain 
conditions which we then call causes of the action. In order to 
know the reason which you had for making a certain statement, for 
acting in a particular way, etc., no number of agreeing 
experiences is necessary, and the statement of your reason is not 
a hypothesis". See also L. WITTGENSTEIN, The Brown Book, in idem■ 




























































































"the internal aspect of desires and beliefs is relevant - even 
for the observer interested in their causal relationships - 
primarily in order to identify them"15. "Desires and beliefs," 
continues Nino, "cannot be identified by their special outlines 
or location in time, but because they are desires and beliefs 
(that this or that person had in this or that circumstance) that 
something be the case or that something is the case. Without 
referring to the propositional content of desires and beliefs, 
we could not in any way identify them for the purposes of 
establishing causal relationships among them"16. Moreover, the 
fact that judgements, desires, beliefs and norms are identified 
on the basis of their propositional content has relevant 
repercussions on the way such judgements, desires, etc. act 
within causal chains, that is, on the way in which they may be 
taken as causes of other occurrences, especially of other 
judgements, desires, etc. As Carlos Nino says, "the desires and 
beliefs are only generated from other appropriate desires and 
beliefs, and which are appropriate depends on their internal 
aspect [....] Even where the generation of new desires from other 
ones and from beliefs is a causal phenomenon, this causal 
phenomenon has to do with propositions that constitute the 
internal aspect of the desires and beliefs and with the logical 
relations among such propositions"17. Put another way, 
judgements, desires, norms etc. can act as causes to the extent 
that their propositional or semantic content is heard or 
understood (that is to say, identified). This understanding is 
a necessary (even if not sufficient) condition for the causal 
relevance of the aforesaid judgements, desires, etc., and 
accordingly the relationship between judgements, desires etc. and 
actions in conformity with them cannot be explained in merely 
causal terms.
The intentions and motives of human conduct are in turn






























































































"filtered" by norms, or are located within a framework of actions 
that have been made possible thanks to norms. One example of 
human conduct determined (made possible) by certain norms is 
going to church to hear mass. There are no masses nor churches 
without norms. An example of conduct "filtered" by rules is 
eating. People eat to satisfy an animal, physiological need, and 
eating does not presuppose any norm in order to exist as merely 
animal behaviour. Yet there is no behaviour more influenced by 
cultural factors than human eating. There are rules of how to 
eat, how to behave at table, for instance how to raise a spoon 
to one's mouth, and there are rules on how to cook and prepare 
a meal, and on what is to be cooked.
Ultimately, the law cannot be portrayed as a natural, objective 
reality, or as a function of this type of reality. The reason is 
that the existence of law coincides with compliance with its 
norms, so that it depends to a certain (very large) extent on 
these norms and their content. That is to say, the norms in the 
case of law, at least its basic norms, are constitutive of the 
reality of the law itself, in the sense that they determine its 
characteristics. Moreover, the law, like society, is an eminently 
cultural, not natural, phenomenon. It acquires "objectivity" to 
fairly limited extents, and only within a specific normative 
framework, or in other words only in respect to a given society 
and a specific historical time. Here it should be stressed that, 
if one accepts that the law is constituted by norms, that is, 
that it is a reality that cannot be conceived of without the 
norms themselves, it cannot be concluded that the law is a mere 
component of empirical reality, since the latter can be thought 
of without assuming any normative reference, or rather, without 
any imputation or attribution of meaning.
The internal viewpoint, the viewpoint of someone regarding rules 
as possible reasons to act in a given way, is indispensable for 
the existence of social rules. As H.L.A. Hart put it, stating his 
concept of legal obligation: "what is needed in order to 




























































































of rules of customary type, is not simply for the rules to be 
supported de facto by social pressure and a general requirement 
for conformity, but that there must be majority consensus that 
these rules are legitimate responses to deviations, in the sense 
that they are required or at least permitted by the system. In 
this way, the pressure and the requirements will not be mere 
foreseeable consequences of the deviations, but normative 
consequences, since they are legitimate in this sense"18. 
However, it is just this "internal viewpoint" that functionalist 
theories (such as Luhmann's) cannot explain nor take into 
account. They perceive the phenomenon of law from an external 
viewpoint, from the viewpoint of the "unconstrained observer". 
The internal viewpoint cannot be taken seriously by those 
"realist" theories that in the best of cases reduce it to a 
psychological "fact" and to a merely subjective state (though 
sometimes referring in order to explain the intersubjectivity of 
social phenomena to the idea of social conditioning, an idea that 
still remains rather mysterious).
The object of the concept of law proposed here is as follows: law 
is an institution. By institution I propose to mean any system 
of norms or rules that are possibility conditions (for thinking 
a priori, and for perception a posteriori) for a framework of 
human conduct, for the case that this conduct is actually 
performed. Put otherwise, an institution is that framework for 
actions that is made possible by norms where the possibilities 
for actions opened by the norms are de facto taken up by human 
subjects.
In order to arrive at an institutionalist conception of law like 
the one adopted here, one must get rid of one old prejudice 
cherished by many generations of philosophers and jurists: that 
rules or norms serve only to restrict, or coerce, or limit 
people's possibilities of action. I would call this the 
"prescriptivist prejudice". In fact norms and rules may also
18 J.R. DE PARAMO, Entrevista a H.L.A. Hart, in "Doxa", 




























































































increase rather than reduce the possibilities and alternatives 
of action. This has been adequately pointed out by, among others, 
Newton Garver. "It might initially seem", - he writes, "that 
rules are essentially and unqualifiedly restrictive, since they 
determine what cannot or what must be done or said. Consideration 
of the role of rules in games and languages shows that this 
supposition is quite wrong. All the rules discussed so far have 
the effect of opening up new realms of activity, by defining the 
acts and practices in question, rather than that of restraining 
men from something they can already do. One cannot play bridge 
at all, one cannot even renege, except by reference to the rules 
which define the game; mathematical logic must remain entirely 
alien to one who won't learn the rules for it; and there are a 
whole host of common human activities such as gossiping, telling 
jokes, giving orders, asking questions, lying, making promises, 
and so forth [ . . . ] that one can engage in only after mastering 
a language"15.
If we accept the definition of institution I have just sketched 
out, not only would law but also other systems of rules 
(etiquette, positive ethics, positive religion, certain types of 
games) would be "institutions" insofar as all these various 
systems of rules are actually observed, giving rise to conduct 
that would not have taken place without those rules. Here there 
accordingly arises the problem of distinguishing the law from 
other normative systems. One solution might be to refer to the 
interests unterlying the norms. This is the path taken by H.L.A. 
Hart in The Concept of Law. Law would then be the institution 
composed of that conduct aimed at the satisfaction of the most 
relevant interests of a given social group. I must however 
confess that this solution seems to me thoroughly questionable 
and highly problematic. This difficulty confirms one's criticism 
of the idea that constitutive rules can definitively exhaust the 
institutions (or practices) resulting from the observance of 
those rules. "The rules (the constitutive rules)", writes Hubert
15 N. GARVER, Rules, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 




























































































Schwyzer, "do not themselves specify the way behaviour carried 
out in accordance with them is to be regarded; this is something 
that the laying down of the rules has itself to assume"20. That 
is to say, the meaning - and accordingly also criteria of 
identification - of the practice or institution do not lie solely 
in the rules that "constitute them".
2. Evolutionary Concepts
According to some sociological theories, one can speak of an 
evolution of society that obeys dynamics like those that seem to 
govern the evolution of biological phenomena. This is the 
conception of social Darwinism and of many Marxist theories 
(recall Engels's praise of Marx as the Darwin of the social 
sciences). It is also, with differing emphases and patterns, the 
conception of sociologists in the functionalist tradition, from 
Durkheim to Parsons and Luhmann.
As we know, for Herbert Spencer evolution was defined as the 
passage from a homogeneous undifferentiated state to a 
heterogeneous differentiated state: "Evolution is an integration 
of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the 
matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a 
definite, coherent heterogeneity"21. This process of 
differentiation would accordingly mark social groups too, since 
social evolution is seen "as at once an increase in the number 
of individuals integrated into a corporate body, an increase in 
the masks and vanities of the parts into which this corporate 
body divides, as well as at the actions called their functions, 
and an increase in the degree of combination among these masks
20 H. SCHWYZER, Rules and Practices, in "Philosophical 
Review", 1969, p. 467.
21 H. SPENCER, First Principles, Reprint of 1904 Edition, in 





























































































and their functions"22. Here evolution undoubtedly means 
progress. According to the British philosopher, as far as the 
human being is concerned "there is a gradual advance towards 
harmony between the mental nature of man and his conditions of 
existence"23.
In the functionalist tradition, which in a way takes up 
Spencerian positions, the concept of evolution is strictly bound 
up with the notions of "diversification” and "complexity". As we 
know, for Durkheim the law of social evolution is what pushes a 
social state formed of homogeneous, similar segments towards a 
social state structured into distinct organs, each charged with 
a specific task24. This law of differentiation is valid for the 
evolution of living beings too. "La même loi préside," he writes, 
"au développement biologique"25.
According to Radcliffe-Brown, one of the classic functionalist 
theorists, the theory of organic and supraorganic (social) 
evolution can be reduced to two fundamental theses: (i) first, 
there is a process of diversification in the development of both 
the forms of organic life and those of social life, thanks to 
which a plurality of different types of organic and social life 
have developed on the basis of a smaller number of original 
types; (ii) second, there is a general trend to develop more 
complex structures and organizations (both organic and social), 
which originate from much simpler structures and 
organizations26.
22 Ibid. , p. 416.
23 Ibid., p. 414.
24 See E. DURKHEIM, De la division du travail social. 6th 
ed., Felix Alcan, Paris 1932, p. 157.
25 Ibid.. p. 167.
26 See A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society. Essays and Addresses, 4th ed., Cohen and West, 




























































































Talcott Parsons's sociological theory does not, I feel, present 
any great changes or novelties in relation to this "paradigm". 
Social evolution is regarded as an aspect in the broader history 
of organic life. The evolutionist sociological perspective that 
he adopts "conceives of man as integral to the organic world, and 
human society and culture as properly analyzed in the general 
framework appropriate to the life process". "Whether the 
adjective 'biological' be used or not, the principle of evolution 
is firmly established as applying to the world of living things. 
Here the social aspect of human life must be included"27.
Again according to Parsons, social evolution advances thanks to 
the two mechanisms of variation (complexity) and diversification 
(response to complexity). "Socio-cultural evolution", he writes, 
"like organic evolution has proceeded by variation and 
differentiation from simple to progressively more complex 
forms "28.
However, in all these theories it remains rather unclear by what 
criteria we can test the "complexity" and "diversification" of 
a social structure. That is, it is unclear in what connection one 
speaks in this context (supraorganic evolution) of "complexity" 
and "diversification". What I wish to stress is the fact that 
concepts like "complexity" and "diversification" are always 
relative to certain criteria, and accordingly change with changes 
in the criteria themselves.
Is today's Italian society where people speak more or less the 
same language more diversified, or was it more diversified a 
century ago when people spoke a variety of different dialects and 
did not understand each other? Is today's European society where 
people dress more or less the same more diversified, or was it 
more diversified two centuries ago when customs and clothes
27 T. PARSONS, Societies. Evolutionary and Comparative 





























































































varied with region, class or social status, and according to, let 
us say, civil status (for instance, married women with different 
coloured skirts from spinsters)? If we took as the criterion of 
"diversification" the variety of clothes or languages, we should 
have to conclude that what has taken place in Italy and Europe 
in the last couple of centuries is not "evolution", but 
"involution", since the variety of clothes and languages has not 
increased, but considerably diminished. That is to say that we 
have, as far as ways of speaking and dressing are concerned, seen 
a process of simplification, or homogenization, not 
diversification.
The concepts of "complexity" and "diversification" refer to 
criteria that are relative, largely dependent on the topic being 
analysed and the observer's viewpoint. These concepts can be used 
as heuristic instruments, but cannot claim to represent any sort 
of ontological principle29.
It should further be noted that the concept of evolution is not 
merely descriptive, but full of value implications. On the ladder 
of evolution, what climbs to the next (higher) rung is also 
"better" than what has stayed at the previous (lower) rung. 
Behind the concept of evolution it is thus possible to discern 
the profile of one of the greatest myths of industrial 
civilization: progress, with its prejudice of European 
ethnocentrism. Very significantly, Talcott Parsons, for instance, 
considers the market economy and democracy as necessary outcomes 
of social evolution, adding that these institutions are not 
simply peculiar inventions of certain societies, but
29 It is perhaps not otiose to mention here that the 
criterion adopted by some biologists to test evolution was the 
so-called "Willinston's law", according to which "the parts of 
an organism tend to reduce in number and specialize in function" 
(N. ABBAGNANO, Dizionario di filosofia, U.T.E.T., Turin 1969, p. 
365). That is, according to this "law" the criterion of evolution 





























































































That the idea of evolution, even in its most recent formulations, 
contains a semantic nucleus that contains the concept of progress 
is demonstrated by some arguments of Klaus Eder, more explicit 
in his progressivist faith and more direct and clear in his 
languange than the often cryptic Habermas. Firstly, Eder shows 
us where the difference lies between traditional (Hegelian) 
historicism and "communicative" (Habermasian) historicism. 
According to the former, history is the actual realization of 
reason, while for the latter history represents only the 
possibility of this realization. "History was no longer 
interpreted as the actual realization of reason, but as the 
possibility of the realization of reason"30 1.
Eder assumes (i) that the structures of moral conceptions can be 
hierarchicalized so as to form a sequence of stages that appear 
as "evolution", and (ii) that this evolution is the product of 
collective learning processes directed towards the construction, 
at different times, of a social order. But when it comes to 
summarizing his two basic assumptions, Eder puts it this way: "My 
two initial assumptions are accordingly that there is something 
like moral progress in history; and that this moral progress is 
bound up with collective core processes in history"32. That is 
to say, the assumption that there is a hierarchy of stages of 
moral conceptions interpretable as an evolution in those 
conceptions is nothing more than the assertion of moral progress 
in history. Evolution here fairly explicitly means "progress". 
As pointed out to us by Helmut Plessner, evolution represents a 
form of industrialist ideology. "Every form of evolutionary
30 See T. PARSONS, Evolutionary Universals in Society, in 
idem. On Institutions and Social Evolution. ed. by L.H. Mayhew, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1985.
31 K. EDER, Kollektive Lernprozesse und Geschichte. Zur 
Evolution moralischer Grundlaaen politischer Herrschaft. in 
"Saeculum XXXIII", 1982, p. 116.




























































































universal history exalts man of the industrial epoch ....  In it,
man of Euro-American culture is at the culminating point of time, 
with behind him states of being now surpassed, and before him an 
infinitely open future of continuing possibilities of growth"33.
On the other hand, for the evolutionary theories evolution is 
like a process that develops in a necessary fashion, that has to 
develop just as it actually does. For instance, when Niklas 
Luhmann talks of the autonomy of social sub-systems, particularly 
the sub-system that the law is for him, he sees this autonomy as 
the outcome of social evolution, affirming that "this autonomy 
is not a desired aims but a fateful necessity"34. Thus, the 
concept of evolution is closely bound up with the idea of 
scientific law, particularly in its ontological version that 
assumes the existence of natural laws in relation to which 
scientific laws expressed in linguistic formulations are merely 
a reflection.
However, if society is a cultural phenomenon, and if cultural 
phenomena differ from natural ones by the fact of being 
constituted through rules, it proves fairly problematic to apply 
to societies and social groups a concept of evolution understood 
as a causally and objectively determined movement. In fact rules 
(at least those that constitute "institutions") bring "something" 
new into the world. The rules of cricket, if observed, 
"constitute" what turns out to be a "new" reality: the game of 
cricket. In the same way the rules of Esperanto, if applied, 
bring a new way of speaking and, to a certain extent, of 
thinking. Establishing a rule of this sort is a creative act, the 
invention of a new pattern of conduct, that is, a new form of 
life, which cannot be explained with respect to the de facto
33 H. PLESSNER, Die verspatete Nation. Über die politische 
Verführbarkeit bürqerlichen Geistes, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 
1988, p. 112.
34 N. LUHMANN, The Self-Reproduction of Law and Its Limits, 
in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, ed. by G. Teubner, W. 




























































































situation preceding it, and accordingly cannot have the classical 
concept of "evolution" applied to it.
Human society is made up of acts and objects that have symbolic 
meaning. This meaning does not derive from any causal necessity 
but is a question of convention, creation, invention, and - if 
I may say so - of free will. Here we come to the split between 
nature and society: the former is governed by causes, the second 
by rules, since the symbols that make up society (which can be 
reduced to the form "x counts as y") are types of constitutive 
rules (in Searle's sense). But if this is the case, if social 
phenomena are governed by rules, by imputations or normative 
ascriptions, they cannot have applied to them a concept like 
"evolution", which is rooted in determinist assumptions.
An evolutionary theory is also sketched out by Friedrich Hayek. 
According to him, the system of rules of conduct present in the 
social order is the outcome of an evolution that has selected the 
system of rules that best ensures the group's efficiency and 
survival in the phase of challenges from the environment. "The 
properties of the individuals," he writes, "which are significant 
for the existence and preservation of the group, and through this 
also for the existence and preservation of the individuals 
themselves, have been shaped by the selection of those from the 
individuals living in groups which at each stage of the evolution 
of the group tended to act according to such rules as made the 
group more efficient"35.
At least two criticisms may be directed against this evolutionary
35 F.H. HAYEK, Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of 
Conduct. in idem■ Studies in Philosophy. Politics and Economics. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1967, p. 72. It might be 
interesting to recall that Hayek also defends an evolutionary 
theory of ethics, though making it something not the object of 
human disposal or rational design. Ethics is thus seen only as 
positive ethics, a structure "given" to man, met with, so to 
speak, and not created by him. See F.A. HAYEK, Le regole della 
morale non sono le conclusioni della nostra ragione, in Libertà. 
giustizia e persona nella società tecnologica, ed. by S. Ricossa 




























































































conception. First, in Hayek's thought we meet with the assertion, 
not further justified, of the homology between human social 
systems and living systems (animals and even plants). Hayek 
himself recognizes that the theory of social evolution has an 
intimate connection with the theory of the evolution of organic 
entities. "The theory of evolution of traditions and habits which 
made the formation of spontaneous orders possible stands 
therefore in a close relation to the theory of evolution of the 
particular kinds of spontaneous orders which we call organisms, 
and has in fact provided the essential concepts on which the 
latter was built"36. It should be stressed that behind this 
evolutionism there emerges a sort of descriptivist fallacy, that 
is, one of reducing the "normative" to the "descriptive", of 
rules to descriptions of states of affairs. In fact, for Hayek 
rules of conduct chiefly denote regularities. and have no 
prescriptive character. "The term 'rule'", he writes, "is used 
for a statement by which a regularity of the conduct of 
individuals can be described"37. "Norms are accordingly," 
asserts the Austrian economist, "an adaptation to the de facto 
regularity we depend on, but know only partially, and can cope 
with only if we comply with those rules"38.
However, Hayek does see the differences between descriptive laws 
and normative laws, though he also believes the two to be closely 
connected. "The factual belief that such and such is the only way 
in which a certain result can be brought about, and the normative 
belief that this is the only way in which it ought to be pursued 
are thus closely associated"39. Thus, Hayek interprets the sense 
of guilt in the event of breaking a rule as the product of the
36 F.A. HAYEK, The Results of Human Action but not of Human 
Design■ in idem■ Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 
cit., p. 101.
37 F.H. HAYEK, Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules 
and Conduct■ cit., P. 67.





























































































fear produced in us by abandoning a known path, a regularity, and 
entering an unknown world. Breaking the rule in this sense means 
leaving the foreseeable for the unforeseeable40. According to 
Hayek, normative rules are informative in nature: they offer us 
information about the environment in which our actions have to 
unfold. Hayek's conclusion is familiar: "At least so long as the 
normative rules consist of prohibitions, as most of them probably 
did before they were interpreted as commands of another will, the 
'thou shalt not' kind of rule may after all not be so very 
different from the rule giving information about what is"41. 
Thus, the semantic and methodological distinction between 
"theoretical information" and "practical information" is 
dissolved42.
Second, the efficiency towards which systems of rules that 
survive are alleged to tend is a vacuous concept. Efficiency is 
in relation to certain goals and certain objectives. But who 
establishes these goals and objectives? What is their content? 
Are they immanent in the very development of things? "Towards a 
more efficient group" is an expression that still needs to be 
filled with content. Moreover, are all systems of rules that have 
asserted themselves in history, that have "won", more efficient 
than those that have "lost", that have been suspended by the 
court of evolution? For instance, was the system of rules 
introduced by the German National Socialists after 1933 more 
efficient than the (losing) system of the Weimar Republic?
A heavy metaphysical concept of evolution of law has been 
recently defended by Erhard Oelser, an Austrian professor of 
philosophy, who tries to connect a strong faith in the power of 
man's reason and a kind of biological evolutionary stance. Here
40 See ibid.. pp. 80-81.
41 Ibid. , p. 81.
42 For this distinction, see 0. WEINBERGER, Eine Semantik 
fur die praktische Philosophie, in "Grazer Philosophische 




























































































we find a model in which an idea of moral progress bases on some 
sort of historical and biological movement and vice versa. "Denn 
wie alle selbstorganisierenden Prozesse in der Natur kennt auch 
der SelbstkonstruktionsprozeB des Rechts keine individuelle 
Instanz, sondern nur einen prozeduralen Mechanismus, der jedoch 
in der praktischen Vernunft jedes einzelnen Menschen seinen 
Trager besitzt. Nur durch diesen intervenierenden Eingriff der 
Vernunft wird aus der Naturgeschichte die Geschichte der 
Menschheit. Wer daher an den Fortschritt der Vernunft in der 
Menschheitsgeschichte glaubt, muB auch die Krote des 
Evolutionismus schlucken"43. This author furthermore assumes a 
system theory point of view, according to which the law is a 
system which evolves thanks to the impulses coming from its 
Umwelt and working through a dynamics of openness and closure 
similar to Niklas Luhmann's views. Nevertheless according to 
Oelser the legal system is not independent from morality, as it 
is in any Luhmannian account of it, but is quite to the opposite 
intrinsically ethical. "Das System des positiven Rechts ist ein 
von der Staatsgewalt und Politik unabhangiges, autonomes System, 
und zwar gerade ausschlieBlich deswegen, weil es in seinen 
Grundnormen auf diesen tieferliegenden rechtsethischen 
Grundsatzen beruht, die kein staatlicher Gesetzgeber dieser Welt 
je verletzen darf, ohne sich selbst durch das so 
heraufbeschworene naturliche Widerstandsrecht, den Untergang zu 
bereiten"44. Thus, a conception of the evolution of law lands in 
the end to (but was perhaps already from the beginning moving 
from) a theory of natural law.
3. Neo-evolutionarv theories
Faced with the criticisms of the teleological determinism of 
"classical" evolutionary theories (Spencer, Darwin, etc.), there 
have been some attempts to reformulate the theories so as to
43 E. OELSER, Evolution und Selbstkonstruktion des Rechts. 
Rechtsohilosophie als Entwicklunastheorie der praktischen 
Vernunft. Bohlau, Wien 1990, p. 11.




























































































avoid the antideterminist criticism. Attacks on the classical 
evolutionary paradigm - as Niklas Luhmann points out - come from 
three sides: (a) from a conception of history that emphasizes the 
uniqueness of the historical event; (b) from a structuralist 
conception that stresses the existence of non-temporal factors 
in societies; (c) from a viewpoint that the German sociologist 
calls "dif fusionist", which stresses the fact that not all 
transformations are internal to the system or the subject under 
consideration45.
The most recent reformulations of the evolutionist paradigm are 
fundamentally based on systems theory and on some ideas coming 
from modern thermodynamics. We read, for instance, in Ervin 
Laszlo's book, published by the Club of Rome: "The laws assumed 
by the sciences of complexity are neither determinist nor 
prescriptive: they do not determine the course of evolution in 
any unequivocal way. Instead, they specify some combinations of 
possibilities within which the evolutionary processes may unfold. 
These are rules of the game, which are to be used at every 
particular moment by the players. Starting from identical initial 
conditions and within the limits of the possibilities laid down 
by the laws, different sequences of events may come about"46. 
Thus, the laws of evolution do not determine specific 
occurrences, but the framework within which they take place.
But this, it may be objected, is also true of many scientific 
laws. The occurrence of Fulano falling in the street some day at 
a particular time is not determined by the law of gravity, still 
less predictable by it. However, in falling Fulano obeys and 
confirms this law. Scientific laws are conditional, which means 
that if the condition is not present the occurrence obeying that 
law does not come about. In this sense, scientific laws only
45 See N . LUHMANN; Geschichte als ProzeB und die Theorie 
soziokultureller Evolution, in idem. Sozioloaische Aufklàruna 3 . 
Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1981, pp. 182-183.
46 E. LASZLO, Evoluzione. Italian trans, by G. Bocchi, 




























































































offer the framework within which a great, I would say infinite, 
variety of occurrences are possible. They too are rules of the 
game, of the game of the happening of natural, or "crude" facts, 
or - as Ota Weinberger might say - "facts independent of men".
One of the contemporary theorists who most powerfully uses the 
"evolution of law" paradigm, is the German sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann. Luhmann states that in his view this paradigm has 
nothing to do with the determinism of last century's evolutionary 
theorists. "Evolution," he writes, "is accordingly not a causal 
process internal to the system, owing its power to some natural 
necessity; in confrontation with the system's environment, it 
realizes the potential for structure-changing 'learning' arising 
from the differentiation of those three functions of variation, 
selection and stabilization in the face of an independently 
changing environment"47. Moreover, he rejects the teleological 
evolutionary view: "evolution does not need direction indicators. 
In no way is it a process oriented towards an end"48. Luhmann 
also rejects models of evolution that use sequences of phases, 
instead defending a model of evolution founded on the internal 
mechanism of evolution, though, as we know, he proposes a 
periodization of social differentiation articulated into three 
phases that succeed each other in time: (i ) segmentary societies, 
(ii) stratified societies, (iii) societies differentiated 
according to functional criteria.
Luhmann adapts the "system" paradigm to the evolutionary 
paradigm: the subjects of evolution are "systems", and the 
"systems" exist insofar as there is an "environment". He goes as 
far as maintaining that "only the difference between system and 
environment makes evolution possible. In other words, no system 
can evolve from itself. If the environment did not always evolve
47 N. LUHMANN, Evolution des Rechts. in idem. 
Ausdifferenzieruno des Rechts. Beitraqe zur Rechtssozioloqie und 
Rechtstheorie. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 15.
48 N. LUHMANN, R. DE GIORGI, Teoria della società. Angeli, 




























































































separately from the system, evolution would rapidly end with an 
'optimal fit'"49. However, refuting the previous thesis, he 
states that "one must start from the assumption that systems can 
transform their structures only through their own operations, 
however those systems may react to what happens in the 
environment"50.
For the German sociologist, the concept of evolution means growth 
in complexity and diversification. "As before," he writes, 
"evolution is understood as increasing complexity, a growth in 
the number and variety of possible components and events"51. And 
this evolution is founded on the "difference between world and 
system"52. "Any change in a system that establishes an increase 
in its potential changes the complexity of the world and thus the 
environment to which other systems have to adapt"53. However, 
elsewhere Luhmann criticizes the concept of evolution as growth 
in complexity. "The old principle," he writes, "that evolution 
is a process going from simple relations to complex relations is 
indefensible, for the simple reason that, as an evident result, 
today less complex systems still coexist with complex 
systems"54. Nonetheless, a few lines further on he reaffirms the 
relevance of complexity as an evolutionary criterion: "However, 
despite all these objections, one cannot deny the fact that in 
the course of evolution tests of complexity are performed, and 
that the construction of more complex systems alongside other
49 Ibid., p. 177. Emphasis in originai.
50 Ibid. , p. 205.
51 Op.ult.cit., p. 13.
52 Ibid., p. 14.
53 Ibid.





























































































less complex ones come about"55, finally reaching the conclusion 
that "social evolution requires a differentiation of evolutionary 
functions"56 57, a differentiation that ipso facto cannot be a 
cause of greater complexity. "To describe the result of evolution 
in general, such formulations as that it consists in making 
higher complexity possible are sufficient'157. For Luhmann, an 
"evolutionary acquisition" is rather the outcome of a local 
reduction of complexity in order to permit, or adapt to, a 
general growth in complexity.
As well as the "exogenous" evolution brought about by changes in 
the surrounding medium there is, according to Luhmann, an 
"endogenous" evolution that comes about through three principal 
processes: (i) variation, or production of new possibilities; 
(ii) selection, i.e. the taking of decisions on the possibilties 
admissible by the system; (iii) stabilization, that is, 
confirmation and protection of the possibilities accepted58. 
These three processes, he adds, are also met within organic 
(living) systems, and there we call them: (i) mutation, (ii) 
survival, (iii) isolation.
As far as the law is concerned, "endogenous" evolution - which 
in Luhmann's theory seems to play the most important part - comes 
about through the growing variety in normative expectations 
("variation"), which cannot all be satisfied (hence their 
"selection"), to the point of a new institutionalization of norms 
(contrafactual expectations) accepted by the system (that is 
"stabilization").
55 Ibid. Cf. ibid., p. 197, where he seems to defend the 
idea that "evolution produces more complex societies", and also
p. 201.
56 Ibid., p. 218.
57 Ibid. , p. 221.
58 See N. LUHMANN, Evolution des Rechts, cit., p. 14. Cf. 





























































































Here, accordingly, there are various problems. First, the very 
concept of normative expectations, which are, according to what 
Luhmann says, those expectations the frustration of which does 
not lead to their abandonment. It seems that for Luhmann the 
expectation precedes the norm. But if this is so, what is the 
normativity (the contrafactual nature) of the normative 
expectation founded on? Second, if the normative expectation 
resists frustrations, that is, breach of the norm it refers to 
or better represents, is it not absurd to keep a norm that is 
always broken? Or, putting it differently, what normativity can 
be claimed by a norm that is never capable of motivating the 
conduct it lays down?59 Are there limits then to the number of 
violations a normative expectation can or should resist? Moreover 
an expectation is always an eminently subjective fact, whereas 
a norm in order to be one has to be independent of the subject's 
individual psychology.
But the most serious problem I see in Luhmann's concept of 
"evolution of law" lies in the very concept of evolution he 
adopts. According to the German author, evolution is, firstly, 
brought about by causal relations between system and environment, 
and, secondly, guided by the three processes of variation, 
selection and stabilization. However, and in the same way as in 
the Hungarian author's concept of evolution considered above, 
these three processes represent invariables, a sort of conditions 
for the occurrences, which retain a certain determinist nature 
despite the non-determinist professions of faith repeatedly 
uttered by Luhmann. "They [the three processes]," writes the
59 For a similar critique to Luhmann's concept of normative 
expectation, see O. WEINBERGER, Institutionentheorie und 
Institutionalistischer Rechtsoositivismus. in idem. Recht. 
Institution und Rechtsoolitik. Grundprobleme der Rechtstheorie 
und Sozialphilosophie. Steiner, Stuttgart 1987, pp. 173-174, and 
0. WEINBERGER, Sozioloqie und Normative Institutionentheorie. 
Überlequnqen zu Helmut Schelskvs Institutionentheorie vom 
Standpunkt der normativistischen Institutionenontoloqie. in idem. 
Recht. Institution und Rechtspolitik. cit., pp. 199-200. See also 
J. HABERMAS, Faktizitàt und Geltunq. Beitraqe zur Diskurstheorie 
des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates. Suhrkamp, 




























































































German sociologist, "define conditions of possibility and areas 
of operation for each other"60. These evolutionary mechanisms 
represent certain rules of the game. But who laid them down? What 
is his ontological or epistemological status? How can we test 
whether these rules are in force? Luhmann does not give us 
answers to these questions.
I think it may be said that in Luhmann's application of the 
evolutionary paradigm it is merely an interpretive model, perhaps 
elegant or interesting, but an interpretive model that has no 
privileged epistemological status vis-à-vis, say, the historicist 
paradigm or the conflictualist or structuralist paradigms. All 
of these are heuristic tools which can help us in studying human 
societies only if we recognize them as such.
4. Evolution as Learning
Another use of the evolutionary paradigm is the one concerned 
with cognitive or epistemological processes. This is the case of 
theories like those proposed by, for instance, Jean Piaget (who 
deals with the question of the child's psychological development, 
especially as far as his perception of reality is concerned), by 
Karl Popper (who tackles the so-called "growth of knowledge"), 
and by Lawrence Kohlberg (who is interested in the development 
of moral concepts in the child) . It is not possible here to 
discuss these theories in detail. What I feel it is important to 
mention is that Jurgen Habermas seeks to apply this way of 
conceiving evolution, namely as a learning process, to social 
phenomena. "I make use of the idea," writes the Frankfurt 
professor, "that societies learn in an evolutionary fashion by 
'institutionally embodying' rationality structures already 
manifested in cultural traditions, that is, making use of them
60 N. LUHMANN, Geschichte als Prozefi und die Theorie 




























































































to reorganize systems of action"61.
This theoretical viewpoint believes it can epistemologically 
justify its evolutionary claims by distancing itself from the 
idea of an objective spirit that runs through history and gives 
it meaning and direction. Instead, it talks of an "evolutionary 
logic", seen as nothing more than the set of rules underlying the 
collective learning processes that underlie the positive ethics 
that is socially in force. "The logic of development," writes 
Klaus Eder, "does not mean (though this has often been suggested) 
an objective spirit that hovers over history or manifests itself 
in history. Developmental logic means something genuinely 
empirical: namely the rules underlying the collective learning 
processes in which people seek to agree on a collectively shared 
ethics"62 stages.
The neo-evolutionary conception based on the notion of learning 
very strongly criticizes the system view, accusing it of still 
being centred in the idea of an "exogenous", or "external" 
evolution caused or guided by a system's adjustment to changes 
in the environment. On the system view, "endogenous" or 
"internal" evolution would still be subordinate to "exogenous" 
or "external" evolution. It is the fundamental assumption of
61 J . HABERMAS, Ùberlegungen zum evolutionàren Stellenwert 
des modernen Rechts. in idem■ Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen 
Materialismus. Ill ed. , Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p. 260. 
However, Habermas adds that "societies 'learn' only in a 
metaphorical sense fin einem iibertraaenen Sinned" (J. HABERMAS, 
Einleituna: Historischer Materialismus und die Entwickluna 
normativer Strukturen. in idem. Zur Rekonstruktion des 
Historischen Materialismus. cit., p. 36).
62 K. EDER, Kollektive Lernprozesse und Geschichte. Zur 
Evolution der moralischen Grundlaaen politischer Herrschaft. 
cit., p. 117. This viewpoint requires strong holistic 
assumptions: "The developing entity in social evolution is not 
the individual, but culture" (K. EDER, Learning and the Evolution 
of Social Systems. An Epigenetic Perspective. in Evolutionary 
Theory in Social Science■ ed. by M. Schmid and F.M. Wuketits, 
Reidel, Dordrecht 1987, p. 102). "Society learns. This often 
contested Durkheimian idea is to be defended against all forms 




























































































Habermas's and Eder's neo-evolutionary critique that evolution 
cannot be explained just by the interaction between system and 
environment. That the effects of a system change the environment 
and that this environment reacts on the system's structure does 
not explain why the system responds to the changes in the 
environment in one particular direction and not another. The 
conclusion is then the following: "Social cultural evolution - 
and this is the general assumption of the theory of evolution - 
is characterized by a primacy of internal evolution over external 
evolution. Speaking of internal evolution means assuming active 
operations and learning processes in the system that is 
adapting"63.
For his evolutionism, Habermas uses the model of the child's 
moral evolution offered by Lawrence Kohlberg. This American 
scholar identifies three levels, each consisting of two stages, 
making a total of six stages, in the child's moral development. 
Moreover, Kohlberg relates each of these levels to a level of 
cognitive development.
The three levels of moral development "discovered" by Kohlberg 
are as follows: (a) the first is the "preconventional” level, 
founded on a cognitive level which is that of "concrete, 
operational thought"; (b) the second level is the one called 
"conventional", the cognitive counterpart of which is again 
"concrete operational thinking"; (c) finally, the third moral 
level is the "postconventional" one, based on the cognitive level 
of "formal-operational thinking"64.
The "preconventional" level consists of two stages: (i) in the 
first, moral conduct is oriented towards avoiding punishment, and 
what is right is considered in terms of physical consequences of
63 K. EDER, Geschichte als Lernprozefi? Zur Pathopenese 
politischer Modernitat in Deutschland. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am 
Main 1991, p. 24.





























































































action; (ii) in the second, defined as "instrumental hedonism", 
what is right is everything that instrumentally satisfies the 
subject's needs.
The two stages of the "conventional level" are (i) the first 
called the "aood-bov orientation", where what is right is what 
is approved by and pleases those who are close to and around the 
acting subject, and (ii) the second, the "law and order 
orientation", where what is morally right is regarded as what 
respects the social authorities and conforms with the duties 
established by those authorities. Finally, the postconventional 
level consists of (i) the contractual-legalist stage, where what 
is morally right is defined in terms of rules and principles laid 
down in critical fashion and by the whole community, and (ii) the 
universalist stage (universal-ethical principle orientation), 
where what is morally right is defined by a decision of 
conscience in accord with ethical principles chosen by the 
subject himself, whose minimum requirements are 
universalizability and consistency. At the various levels, 
different mechanisms of sanction operate. At the preconventional 
level, the sanction is physical punishment; at the conventional 
level the sanction is a feeling of shame or regret, and finally 
at the postconventional level a feeling of guilt. Also different 
at the various levels is the scope of validity of the ethics: at 
the preconventional level it is the natural and social 
environment perceived as something non-differentiated; at the 
conventional level, as far as the first stage goes, the people 
with whom there are direct relations; and as far as the second 
stage goes, members of the socio-political group considered. At 
the postconventional level, the scope of validity will, at the 
first stage, be all those belonging to the social group, and at 
the second stage, particular subjects considered as 
individuals65.
65 To a certain extent the theory of the child's moral 
levels developed by Kohlberg recalls Comte's conception of the 
three evolutionary stages of the human mind: theological, 
metaphysical, positive (see e.g. A. COMTE, Discours sur l'esprit 




























































































Habermas, and Klaus Eder, seek to transfer this evolutionary 
scheme to the various historical types of societies. Thus, 
according to them, to the preconventional moral level there 
correspond the vorhochkulturelle Gesellschaften. primitive 
societies, to the conventional level the archaische Hochkulturen 
and entwickelte Hochkulturen. and to the postconventional level 
the societies of the Friihe Moderne. In primitive societies 
(vorhochkulturelle Gesellschaften) there is no distinction 
between rules and actions; a sort of objective responsibility 
prevails, with as sanction reprisal. In developed societies, in 
the first stage (archaische Hochkultureni a differentiation takes 
shape between rules and actions, an individual concept of 
responsibility is applied and there may be sanctions similar to 
our penalties. In the second stage (entwickelte Hochkulturen(, 
one for the first time meets forms of jurisdiction. In the Early 
Modern Period (Friihe Moderne), finally, there is further 
differentiation between rules, actions and principles justifying 
the rules, the law becomes highly formalized and political power 
is moralized to the point of bureaucratization.
Basing himself on Kohlberg's theories, Klaus Eder distinguishes 
two basic forms of political power (politische Herrschaft): (i) 
conventional political power (konventionelle Herrschaft) and (ii) 
post-conventional power (postkonventionelle Herrschaft1. In the 
first type "the moral foundations of political power derive 
directly from the order of the world"66, and "the fact that 
political power is collectively accepted results from the 
universal order seen as objectively given"67. In the 
"conventional" type of political power, natural reality seems to 
be reflected and duplicated in social reality. In the "post-
Evolution from the "theological" stage to the "positive" one 
takes the form, to be sure, of phylogenesis, but one cannot rule 
out this evolution being also conceived of as ontogenetic.
66 E. EDER, Kollektive Lernprozesse und Geschichte. Zur 






























































































conventional" type of power, instead, "the fact that political 
power is accepted results from the power's insertion in, or 
better subordination to, a universalist moral order"68. Here 
"social reality no longer coincides with the objective order of 
the world"69. All this has as a consequence that in the 
"conventional" form of power no criteria are available to locate 
oneself reflexively vis-à-vis the power, while in the situation 
of "post-conventional" power this critical attitude is possible.
These divisions into periods suggested by Habermas and Eder are 
certainly interesting, perhaps more interesting than many other 
typologies. What seems questionable is whether this succession 
of periods constitutes an evolution, in the sense of having any 
sort of element of necessity or "progress". Still more 
questionable is the combination of an ontogenetic perspective 
(the child's moral evolution) and a phylogenetic one (the 
evolution of the various types of societies), and the analogy set 
up between the evolution (even if "moral") of living creatures 
and the evolution of social entities.
As Ernst Tugendhat points out, the thesis of the evolution of 
concepts of moral justification has three conditions, (i) That 
there be manifold, distinct concepts of moral rationality, (ii) 
That these concepts can be ordered, classified, according to a 
hierarchy in which each higher stage also represents an increase 
in rationality. (That is to say that the various moral 
conceptions can be put in order according to a criterion that 
allows them to be seen as an advance in rationality), (iii) 
Finally, that the criterion that allows us to assert the growing 
rationality of the various moral systems be also a temporal, 
historical criterion. (That is to say that the "higher" stage of 
moral rationality be the later in time or more recent from a
68 Ibid. , p., 120.




























































































historical viewpoint)70. However, in (ii) the ordering criterion 
cannot be anything but a moral conception, and in (iii) one has 
to assume that history qua history is moral, thus falling into 
an intolerable metaethical historicist cognitivism, which by 
assigning the historical present a predominant ethical value 
invalidates any attempt at reflexivity on and moral critique of 
the status quo.
Habermas does not manage to get out of the dilemma between 
evolutionary (functionalist) temptations and recognition of the 
need for a normative (independent) viewpoint. At one point he 
asserts the existence of an evolutionary trend internal to 
certain normative regulations or certain principles, such as the 
fundamental rights of man. "When fundamental norms, like the 
right to free expression of opinion or the right of participation 
in universal, free and secret elections," he writes, "are once 
recognized in principle and allowed, then the applications too 
by no means vary arbitrarily from one situation to another, but 
at least in the longer view take the directed course of an ever 
more consistent realization of their universal content"71. And 
at another point he maintains that this does not mean assuming 
any sort of historicist position: "everything could have happened 
differently"72, subsequently contradicting himself by the 
following assertion: "from the history of human rights, we can 
derive indications to maintain that the power of judgement by 
practical reason (die Urteilskraft zur praktischen Vernunft) does 
not come about by chance"73. However, when facing
70 E . TUGENDHAT, Zur Entwicklunq von moralischen 
Beqriindunqsstrukturen im modernen Recht. in Argumentation und 
Recht, ed. by W. Hassemer, A. Kaufmann, U. Neumannn, Steiner, 
Wiesbaden 1980, p. 5.
71 J. HABERMAS, Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 43, Cfr. J. HABERMAS, MoralbewuRtsein 
und kommunikatives Handeln, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1983, p. 
115.





























































































"communitarian" and objectivist conceptions offering as 
rationality criterion of a "form of life" the promotion of the 
integration and stability of social practices, he objects: "What 
is functional to the maintenance of a life practice cannot be 
called ethics"74.
In fact the theories of Habermas and Eder, and still more of 
Luhmann, are to a certain extent products of a rooted 
functionalist Weltanschauung. since they are theories that must 
assume an intrinsic rationality of social entities, that is, 
certain normative qualifications (the rationality criteria) 
independent of any reflexive, subjective or intersubjective 
consideration. Thus, societies are once again seen through a 
model of interaction between system and environment. In this 
model, however, the question immediately arises what criteria are 
to enable us to distinguish between system and environment, and 
how to establish the identity, and accordingly the limits, of the 
system.
Eder's critique of Luhmann can be turned against its own author. 
"The theoretical view," objects Eder against Luhmann's 
evolutionism, "is too general: the evolution of a system cannot 
be explained on the basis of the interaction between system and 
environment alone. Variation, selection and stabilization do not 
simply happen on a basis of "rationality of connection". Instead, 
they happen according to particular viewpoints, and the point is 
to identify these viewpoints"75. The question, then, is what 
these viewpoints (Gesichtspunkte) are that regulate the 
variation, selection and stabilization of the development of a 
"system". They are normative viewpoints, which as such cannot 
merely "be there", since they must in some sense be external to 
the system itself, that is, external to its objective 
structuring.
74 Ibid., p. 41.





























































































Similarly, one might use against Eder (and against Habermas) the 
objections Eder brings against the theories of social Darwinism. 
Social Darwinism breaks down because of its failure to recognize 
the role played in social actions by human reflexivity. Thanks 
to this, the social actor can wonder about the course of events, 
evaluate them, and if appropriate decide to act against them. 
"Where sociological Darwinism," writes Eder, "ultimately fails 
is on the fact that social actors can relate reflexively to 
themselves and to their environment. This possibility of relating 
in an objectivizing attitude to oneself and to the environment 
makes possible the taking of a critical distance to the given. 
This constitutes an inner reality that contrasts with an outer 
reality and can not only strengthen but also oppose its selective 
effectiveness. This capacity, however, breaks through the 
conceptual framework of the Darwinist theory of evolution"76. 
Nor, however, can the reflexive capacities of the social actor 
be based on the neo-evolutionist scheme founded on the assumption 
of learning by social systems, if this is to mean something 
"objective" of the systems's own. The system is in fact 
"condemned" to be examined, assessed and "elaborated" reflexively 
by the actor. Thus, to explain a trajectory of social actions, 
or the development of a "system", this reflexivity has to be 
taken into account. It is expressed in the values, principles, 
and criteria adopted by the actor himself.
The understanding of social conduct, the study of social 
phenomena, require what I would call, following a proposal by 
Neil MacCormick, "the internal cognitive viewpoint", that is, the 
serious consideration of the ideas, intentions, rules and 
principles of social actors. And a serious consideration of 
ideas, intentions, etc. of social actors rules out their 
reduction to elements of an "ideology", a subjective disguise for 
objective causal determinants. An evolutionist posture in social 
sciences implies, by contrast, either the assumption of an 
external viewpoint, that is, one oriented solely to establishing




























































































regularities of a more or less causal type, fairly insensitive 
to the reasons for social actions from the agent's viewpoint 
(that is, those propositional contents that may constitute 
premises for an argument whose conclusion is the need to perform 
some particular conduct), or else the assumption of a strongly 
normative internal viewpoint, that is, in this case, a viewpoint 
of someone who takes over, adopts, the normative criteria of the 
society or community of which he is an observer and member, to 
apply them to societies or communities of which he is only an 
observer.
The sole theoretical and not ideological uses of the concept of 
evolution possible within the sphere of the social sciences are 
metaphorical and with purposes of classification. As far as 
social groups at any rate are concerned, evolution does not 
represent an objective, finalized movement, a law of teleological 
type even if with no preestablished goal, nor a linear process 
that would enable us fairly positively to assess what happened 
"after" and relatively negatively assess what happened "before", 
nor any dynamic objective of adaptation or learning.
"Evolution" if one wishes to maintain the term, cannot be more 
than the passage of time and transformation. This time and this 
transformation have no meaning, still less value in themselves. 
Meaning and value come from the rules of the society considered, 
and from the viewpoint adopted by the social actors. Thus one 
might, perhaps, adopt the definition of social evolution given 
us by Eder: "social evolution is the substitution of one 
principle of social organization by another"77, without adding 
that "the change in principles of organization presupposes 
instrumental cognitive learning processes"78.
77 K. EDER, Die Entstehung staatlich orqanisierter 
Gesellschaften. Ein Beitraq zu einer Theorie sozialer Evolution,
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1980, p. 167.




























































































5. Law as Autopoiesis
One of the most important theories of evolution of law recently 
proposed is Gunther Teubner's. To begin with, the German scholar 
distinguishes between "evolutionist" and "evolutionary" 
conceptions: the former are seen as conceiving evolution as 
directed towards a particular goal, and the latter as being 
founded on the mechanisms that enable evolution, leaving aside 
any consideration of any end it may have. While the former are 
loaded with normative and metaphysical elements, the latter - 
what Teubner calls "evolutionary concepts" - are taken to be less 
criticizable at epistemological level. "The theory of evolution," 
says this German lawyer, "is concerned with - and should confine 
itself to - the question of how mechanisms form that select 
structural patterns from blind variation, make them last and thus 
control the development of systems"79.
"Evolutionary" theories do not, according to Teubner, take on the 
task of offering predictions about specific happenings, but that 
of predicting "structures" within which the shape of specific 
occurrences is fairly arbitrary. Thus he believes that these 
theories cannot be objected to on the ground that they are 
founded on determinist metaphysics. Still less can they be 
accused of not managing to predict specific social occurrences. 
By comparison with traditional evolutionism, the "reformed" 
evolutionism proposed by Teubner is characterized by three 
features: (i) a "blind" development through the mechanisms of 
variation, selection and stabilization; (ii) the combination of 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis; (iii) the coevolution of 
environment and system.
As we see, Teubner maintains that the typical mechanisms of 
evolution are "variation", "selection" and "stabilization" (which 
he also calls "retention", Retention). For him, this paradigm 
differs from the traditional evolutionist models by stressing the
79 G. TEUBNER, Recht als autopoietisches System. Suhrkamp, 




























































































fact that the interplay of the three mechanisms is "blind", that 
is, has no preestablished goal. Moreover, the post-Darwinist 
evolutionism proposed by Teubner is characterized, by comparison 
with Darwinist evolutionism, by not reducing the subjects, the 
protagonists, of social evolution to biologically definable 
entities. The subjects of evolution are here instead systems of 
social communication. "Evolution in the sense defined here, as 
interplay of variation, selection and retention, can occur at all 
in society and law only once the corresponding mechanisms are 
formed in the communicative sphere. The unit of social or legal 
evolution is however neither the human individual, nor a group 
of people, nor a "selfish" gene, but society or law themselves 
as systems of social communication"80.
Theoreticians of "evolution of law", in general conceived of as 
an outcome of the evolution of society face two problems with no 
solution in a view of evolution of law as being determined by the 
development of social forces. These two problems are: the stasis 
sometimes present in legal systems despite changes in the social 
system; the conservation of the identity of the legal system in 
a position where it is continually subject to the development of 
the social system.
Traditional evolutionism bases the evolution of law on a dynamics 
that can more or less be traced back to the one between structure 
and suprastructure elaborated in Marxist thought: society as 
structure being held to determine law as suprastructure, in 
unidirectional fashion. To this evolutionism Teubner counterposes 
a conception centring round the idea of co-evolution. This he 
manages thanks to his theory of autopoiesis, according to which 
social systems, including law, are closed systems that reproduce 
themselves through internal dynamics, not through external 
stimuli. This does not mean that the environment does not 
exercise some influence on the "system", but this happens through 
"perturbations", "turbulence", to which the system responds by




























































































in every case following "reflexive" mechanisms of its own. "To 
date," writes Teubner, "the introduction of autopoiesis into 
legal evolution has led to the impression that evolution is 
internalized in the social sub-systems and takes place only as 
an isolated development within autonomous social spheres. It 
would certainly be wrong to exclude the environment from 
evolutionary processes. Autopoietic closure does not mean that 
the system is independent of the environment. But the relation 
with the environment in evolution is not produced in direct, 
causal, external production of legal developments, but in 
processes of co-evolution, in which the co-evolving systems act 
on each other in perturbatorv fashion"81. This "perturbing" 
relation between system and environment is, following Luhmann's 
proposal, called "structural coupling".
As we have seen, Teubner aspires to the rehabilitation of 
evolutionism. He pursues this aim through an elaborate strategy. 
Its fundamental impact is the presentation of a "new" 
evolutionism, distinguished from the traditional (Darwinian, 
Spencerian) type, as I have said, by the following 
characteristics: (i) Evolution has no pre-established goal, (ii) 
It is not a markedly determinist movement, so that it can 
establish predictions only of structures of facts and not of 
specific facts: "I think that a theory of legal evolution has 
great analytical and practical power if it withdraws its 
extensive explanatory claims and returns to pure pattern 
predictions [...] A theory of legal evolution will therefore only 
be in the position to explain general structural patterns of the 
legal system, but not individual legal events"82.
(iii) The relation between system and environment is revised, 
so that they now appear to influence each other mutually. This 
is not a unidirectional relation where the environment determines
81 Ibid. . p. 78.
82 G. TEUBNER, Evolution of Autopoietic Law. in Autopoietic 
Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, ed. by G. Teubner, de 




























































































the system (in the case of the law: where the social system 
determines the legal system), but a bidirectional relationship, 
where environment and system influence each other reciprocally 
(thus, co-evolve). Teubner further affirms that the perturbation 
of the social system on the legal subsystem, since it is not 
unequivocally determinant, is not a causal relation, and 
accordingly that the concept of co-evolution cannot be accused 
of being a determinist theory: "The environmental reference in 
evolution however is produced not in the direct, causal 
production of legal developments, but in processes of co­
evolution"83.
(iv) The evolution of social systems is seen as not having much 
in common with the evolution of living systems, since social 
systems are not conceived of as groups, collectivities, 
assemblies of living individuals, but as cultural phenomena, 
communication networks: "Evolving units are not, as social 
Darwinsim has it, human individuals and their aggregates, groups, 
organizations, nations, races, but socio-cultural phenomena"84. 
Thus the fact of biological evolution could not in any way be the 
basis for the existence of a social evolution. (This also seems 
to be the opinion of Luhmann: he states that "from the fact that 
there exists an evolution of living systems one cannot draw the 
conclusion that there would have to exist an evolution of social 
systems"85). In this connection Teubner brings a criticism 
against Habermas's evolutionism, which as we have seen connects 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis, or rather evolution of the 
individual's moral sense and social evolution, inasmuch as 
Habermas on the one hand seems to reintroduce finality into the 
evolutionary movement, but mainly because the Frankfurt 
philosopher bases social evolution on psycho-physical phenomena 
(moral evolution), without clarifying how it is possible for the
83 Ibid.. p. 235. My emphasis.
84 Ibid., p. 228.





























































































evolutionary mechanisms of individual psychology to be 
transferred to social entities, since the latter cannot be 
reduced to a mere sum of psycho-physical individuals86. Teubner 
proposes an alternative conception of the combination between 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis: the former would consist of the 
individual legal occurrences (in particular, individual 
proceedings), while phylogenesis would appear in the legal 
tradition. "Thus, the interplay of phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
development in law can be conceived as the linkage of two 
communicative cycles. The particular legal proceeding is in a 
sense the laboratory of law in which variations are produced and 
selection tried out. This is linked to the second communicative 
cycle which decides about the stabilization of legal selections 
in legal culture and legal tradition"87.
Now as far as (i) is concerned, the concept of "blind" evolution 
counterposed by Teubner to the "classical" concept of evolution 
with a pre-established goal, it has to be said that he over­
dramatizes the counterposition. In fact evolutionism (including 
the "classical" variety) differs from historicist philosophies 
just by doing without a "goal" of history, though it keeps the 
idea of a movement intrinsic to history itself. As far as (ii) 
is concerned, as we have already said the fact that the laws of 
evolution do not determine or allow the prediction of specific 
occurrences does not distinguish them from other scientific laws. 
Moreover, even in the modern version proposed by Teubner, there 
remains the idea of determination, at least of "structures", 
brought about by the evolutionary dynamic, a determination 
brought about in accordance with relations that 
continue to be causal. This means that we are not very far here 
from the traditional determinist approach.
As far as (iii) is concerned, it should be recalled that 
according to Teubner society and law constitute autopoietic
86 See G. TEUBNER, op.ult.cit., p. 226.




























































































systems, that is to say, systems closed in on themselves, 
communicating with other systems only through "perturbations" and 
"noise". Here we certainly meet something new by comparison with 
"classical" evolutionism, but this novelty accentuates rather 
than attenuates the typical idea of evolutionism: the existence 
of an intrinsic movement in the entity ("system") considered. 
The intrinsic nature of development (of "evolution"), from an 
autopoietic viewpoint, is raised to the extreme. Moreover, one 
might raise against this aspect of Teubner's theory a criticism 
used by Klaus Eder against Luhmann. The fact that the system 
reacts on the environment and that the relation between the two 
is mutual does not yet tell us what are the "viewpoints" and 
criteria for this mutual influence. This, however, is just what 
is relevant in the explanation of social phenomena. Finally, when 
he tells us that co-evolution is not causal determination, it 
seems that Teubner is juxtaposing the unambiguousness or 
unidirectionality of the causal relation with causality itself. 
The confusion is between a "sufficient" or "direct" (in his 
terminology) cause and a cause "in general", since not all causes 
have to be "sufficient" or "direct" in order nonetheless to 
continue being causes of certain effects.
Moreover, we can perceive some uncertainty in Teubner's defending 
the thesis of communication of mutual "perturbations". Confronted 
with the many connections law entertains with, for instance, 
morality, economic policies and politics, he has to assume a 
"general social communication"88. That means that the system of 
law and other social systems (education is a further case 
together with family etc.) can be in touch on the same issue. 
This allows more than mere observation or regulation between the 
various systems, that is, a real communication. This 
communication nevertheless is not based on some discourse or 
rules common to the various systems, a "Superdiscourse" - as 
Teubner says; it is simply the outcome of the fact that the
88 See G. TEUBNER, Die Episteme des Rechts. in Wachsende 
Staatsaufqaben - sinkende Steuerunasfàhiakeit des Rechts. ed. by 




























































































various systems undergo an event which takes place at precisely 
the same time in each of them. "Contemporaneity" guarantees for 
communication89. Each autopoietic system works on its own, 
thanks to its own rules, and the acts each of them undertakes at 
a certain time can be the same, that is, communicative, only 
because of their contemporaneous taking place. Now, as Habermas 
has pointed out,90 contemporaneity does not guarantee the 
identity of an expression if there is not a common semantical 
rule, that is, a common, shared body of linguistic rules. On the 
other side, in the causalist perspective assumed by Teubner the 
contemporaneity of the "same" act is fully due to a chance. If 
we had at this point of time contemporaneity, we cannot be sure 
that we shall have it in the future, and in any case we cannot 
foresee the moments or the occasions in which we shall have 
contemporaneity again. This of course makes communication not 
only instable, but indeed impossible, since any expectation of 
being understood will base on a difficult calculation of 
probabilities. Unless we assume perturbations or interferences 
between systems governed by iron laws as those which direct 
planets' revolutions. This would mean falling once again into a 
determinist theory, a solution which Teubner - I suspect - would 
hardly find satisfactory.
As regards (iv), it should be recognized that Teubner explicitly 
distances himself from conceptions like social Darwinism and 
other more recent ones that propagate the idea of the "selfish 
gene" ("sociobiology"), and that he criticizes the basing of 
social evolution on biological or even psychological mechanisms. 
It is nonetheless the case that the concept of autopoiesis with 
which Teubner connects the concept of evolution comes from the 
world of biology. Biologists were, as we know, its first 
theorists. It is egually true that this concept carries within 
itself on the one hand the conviction that the same mechanisms 
(even if very abstract) function both in living processes and in
89 Ibid. , p. 27.




























































































social relations, and on the other the illusion of possessing a 
key to understanding a whole series of actual phenomena. In this 
aspect, autopoietic theory comes out with much stronger ambitions 
than those cherished by "classical" evolutionism.
For an assessment of Teubner's theory, one must further analyse 
its content. its substantive aspect, that is, the more concrete 
(or less abstract) description it gives us of the "functions" of 
the evolution of law. This is in the first place, as we have 
seen, conceived of as endogenous evolution, since the law is 
defined as a closed, self-reflexive system whose only link with 
the outside is through perturbation. It'should be added that for 
the German scholar there are two aspects of evolution of law: one 
before and one after the formulation of law itself as an 
autopoietic entity. Thus, it should be stressed, autopoiesis does 
not explain the whole evolution of law. In the pre-autopoietic 
condition the functions of variation, selection and retention are 
outside the legal system: "in a pre-autopoietic condition of law, 
all three functions are fixed in societal institutions and 
therefore are external to the legal system"91. It is only once 
there is autopoiesis that the free evolutionary mechanisms can 
be internalized, since from that point on "evolution can [...] 
only be 'triggered off' from outside, but no longer directly 
caused"92. "Variation" thus does not derive from greater 
complexity in social rules and interests. Nor does it depend on 
conflicts in society. The same applies to transformations in the 
theory of law. They are of causal relevance for the evolution of 
law only indirectly. As far as selection goes, "social approval 
of the norm is no longer the factor governing selection"93. This 
function depends entirely on the internal compatibilities of the 
legal system. Finally, "retention" too has nothing to do with 
social processes, so that it is the legal system itself that 
predetermines the conditions for its own change.
91 G. TEUBNER, Evolution of Autopoietic Law, cit., p. 233.
92 Ibid.




























































































The "moral" of this theory is an absolute autonomy of the legal 
dimension, such as even Hans Kelsen, so attached to the purity 
of the legal "ought", would never have ventured to uphold. 
According to the autopoietic theory, the validity, legitimation, 
justification and even transformation of law are possible only 
within the frameworks pre-established by the law itself. 
Ultimately, the theory of autopoiesis looks like a conservative 
paradigm. This impression might also be confirmed by the fact 
that when Teubner discusses the relation between ontogenesis and 
phylogenesis, that is, between the individual legal proceeding 
and the legal tradition, and describes the case of divergent 
expectations, of the breakdown of interaction or of the expulsion 
of alternatives regarded as incompatible, he adds that a real 
breakdown can effectively arise only at the ontogenetic level. 
At the phylogenetic level it is a fairly unlikely possibility. 
"A real disintegration can correspondingly not occur on the 
phylogenetic level or is only conceivable as an extreme 
borderline case"94. Thus, the image that the theory of 
autopoiesis conveys to us is one of a legal system immune to 
conflicts, to political and social changes, and even to the "hard 
cases" that may throw the consistency and self-integration of the 
order into crisis. Here, paradoxically, a view of the legal order 
as closed, complete and self-sufficient (a rigidly legal 
formalist concept, accordingly) is linked through the pathway of 
sociological reflection, which by its history and nature would 
seem to have to be more open and sensitive to the dynamics and 
needs of society than any legal doctrine.
The theory of autopoietic law is two things at once: a 
sociological theory and a rather radical legal formalist 
conception. Behind it, at any rate, one can discern an option de 
leae ferenda in favour of "reflexive" law, that is, not 
instrumentalized by the State, which is extraneous to many legal 
formalist theories. His error, I feel, is to posit too strict 
equivalence between "autonomous" (self-referential) law and non-




























































































instrumentalized law, just as, on the other hand, he trusts to 
the equivalence between "positive" law and "liberal" law, or 
rather between "legal positivism" and "liberalism". It suffices 
to review the "evolution" of modern political and legal 
institutions to realize that the figure of the State has been 
constructed theoretically, (and practically as well) as a 
positive, autonomous legal order, as an autopoietic system in 
other words, not necessarily in the direction of the 
domestication of its power, but even in the opposite direction: 
to affirm a claim to absolute dominance.
6. Towards a Critique of the "Evolution of Law" Paradigm
Finally, we come to the central question of these considerations: 
what use can be made of the paradigm of "evolution of law"?
One might understand this expression in the sense of "progress 
of law", Rechtsfortschritt in German. One might, I feel, 
plausibly speak of "progress of law" if one applied the term 
"progress" to a specific situation assessed in relation with 
definite criteria. In this case "progress" would be equivalent 
to a positive assessment in relation to a particular criterion, 
an assessment that would as its object have a specific state of 
affairs. Thus, I would not have much doubt about treating as 
"progress of law" legislation that allows divorce by comparison 
with legislation that does not.
By contrast, it would be unacceptable to speak of "progress" in 
a general sense in relation to a series of temporally distinct, 
successive situations, without bringing out any normative 
criterion, but assuming that this is intrinsic to the temporal 
movement. This would be a highly metaphysical conception, founded 
on a (rather optimistic) philosophy that assumes that history is 
pursuing a goal and is unfolding towards it. Behind the idea that 
history pursues a goal we might perhaps glimpse the idea of the 




























































































idea are clearly religious95.
The conception of a general "progress of law" has strong 
eschatological aspects; and an eschatology can only be a question 
of faith, never of scientific verification nor of common sense. 
From human experience, nothing and no one can verify such a view 
of history. Perhaps experience shows us the contrary: that 
history has no meaning, no purposes, that in it everything is, 
when all is said and done, pretty absurd.
"Does there really exist a progress of law in history?" asks 
Ottfried Hoffe96. The reply is as follows: "There are always 
changes in law. But mere changes do not yet imply progress. One 
can speak of progress of law only where the changes bring 
improvements"97. If one assumes the presence of progress in the 
history of men, says Hoffe, one has to assume that "we are 
subject to forces pushing us in a particular direction"98.
95 All this is penetratingly seen by Plessner: "As long as 
the idea of the end of history by internal self-transcendence has 
validity, the connection with the Christian view is guaranteed, 
even if the historical contents lose their transcendental nature 
thereby and become humanized, even if the structures of the 
epochs shift or disappear entirely. The end of history as its 
fulfilment, the absolutely original directedness of its movement 
towards that goal in which it ends, the stepwise realization of 
the significant plan not only through the mouth of annunciation 
and prophecy but through the course of events itself; these are 
the categories, indeed the formalizable categories, of the 
universal historical consciousness. Originally met by the 
Christian faith, they are still retained even by later 
faithlessness as the ordering principles of historical 
understanding. Thus, they outlast the decay of religion by fading 
into forms of an ultimately inward overall patterning of 
historical happening" (H. PLESSNER, Op. cit.. pp. 106-107).
96 H. HOFFE, Gibt es in der Geschichte einen 
Rechtsfortschritt?. in idem. Den Staat braucht selbst ein Volk 
von Teufeln. Philosophische Versuche zur Rechts- und Staatsethik. 
Reclam, Stuttgart 1988, p. 133. See also R. DREIER, Das 
Fortschrittsproblem in rechtstheoretischer Sicht. in 
Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsentwickluna. ed. by U. Immenga, 
Schwartz, Gottingen 1980, pp. 1 ff.
97 Ibid.




























































































Though the subjects, the protagonists, of this progress are human 
beings, it is assumed that the progress of law "unfolds 'behind 
their backs', that is, follows a secret plan"99. This plan is 
mysterious to us, and cannot be other than a product of Gods, 
whose morality seems rather questionable.
However, as we have seen, some evolutionary theorists deny that 
their concept of evolution has anything to do with the notion of 
progress. Evolution of law would thus not be equivalent to 
"progress of law", would not have any evaluative component, would 
be value neutral. Nonetheless, the concept of evolution cannot 
be metaphysically or ontologically neutral. Thus, either the 
concept of evolution means only a transformation between states 
of affairs, and in this case it is fairly devoid of content and 
theoretically rather uninteresting; or the concept of evolution 
amounts to the idea of a guided, finalized movement, in which 
case one would have to have recourse to a more or less 
historicist or teleological, or downright eschatological, 
metaphysics. In the latter case one would have to assume the 
existence of intrinsic forces driving the temporal course of the 
phenomena under consideration. In any case, in theories of 
evolution there is a constant temptation to confuse the level of 
description of actual facts, that is, the empirical study of 
reality, and the level of prescription of a state not yet 
existing that is nonetheless taken as just and desirable, that 
is, a normative theory. This confusion is even recommended by 
Gunther Teubner when he writes that "one should not adhere to the 
wrongly posed alternatives of description versus 
prescription"100.
Every evolutionary theory seems to amount to the assumption that 
between three or more specific facts causally connected with each
99 Ibid.
100 G. TEUBNER, Evolution of Autonoietic Law, cit., p. 225; 
for a critique of this position cf. E. BLANKENBURG, The Poverty 
of Evolutionism. A Critique of Teubner's Case for "Reflexive 




























































































other there is a single scientific law connecting them all among 
themselves. As Karl Popper writes, "no sequence of, say, three 
or more causally connected concrete events proceeds according to 
any single law of nature. If the wind shakes a tree and Newton's 
apple falls to the ground, nobody will deny that these events can 
be described in terms of causal laws. But there is no single law 
such as that of gravity, nor even a single definite set of laws, 
to describe the actual or concrete succession of causally 
connected events"101.
Through experience we cannot immediately solve the problem of 
evolution. By experience we cannot arrive at knowledge of whether 
the temporal course of human societies and legal orders 
represents, or constitutes, or is interpretable as "evolution". 
We are left with an a priori hypothesis of evolution. But how is 
that possible? The answer might be as follows: "It is possible 
only if whose who assert evolution realize and organize the facts 
on which their assertions are based. This conclusion is not 
implausible as far as jurists go; their theories at least contain 
a mixture of descriptive elements and prescriptive elements. It 
might be that the jurist who asserts evolution towards, for 
instance, greater autonomy of law or towards "reflexive law", is 
working in this direction. However, there are two problems here 
that are hard to solve.
(i) That the assertion of an end and action to secure it 
coincide can arise only looking towards the future, that 
is, between two states, the present one and the future one 
reachable through present action thanks to its direct 
consequences. The past remains ipso facto unreachable, as 
does a little more remote future where the action of 
evolutionary theory can never manage to have effects, (ii) 
Though the theorist's action is exercised on an immediate 
or reachable future, the theorist, just like any other 
human subject, will never secure complete control over all
101 K.R. POPPER, The Poverty of Historicism. Routledge & 




























































































the causes of the facts that constitute the predicted or 
theorized evolutionary state. It is always possible, and 
likely in the case of the jurist shut up in his ivory 
tower, that the human subject cannot steer the causal 
determinants in the direction of the planned or theorized 
goal.
In any case, I think that once we have accepted the concept of 
law as "institution", which I have very briefly sought to present 
in the first section of these notes, we cannot accept a "strong" 
notion of evolution of law, that is, as an directed 
transformation covering a fairly broad series of temporal 
instants. "Institutions", as I have already said, represent 
something "new" in the temporal course of phenomena. This 
"novelty" results from two factors: (i) from the rules that are 
the "causes" of the sphere of actions opened up by them, which 
did not exist before these rules; (ii) from the specific actions 
of human beings who use or utilize the possibilities of action 
brought by those rules, that is, attribute an "intention" to 
them.
As has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, and before him by Kant, 
rules do not regulate their own application. "Rules," writes 
H.L.A. Hart, "cannot provide for their own application"102. We 
may, obviously, have a meta-rule that regulates the application 
of a particular rule, and then yet another meta-meta-rule for the 
application of the meta-rule, and so on. But we cannot allow 
ourselves meta-rules ad infinitum. At some point, at some level 
of normative discourse, we can no longer have recourse to another
102 H.L.A. HART, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, in idem. 
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Clarendon, Oxford 1988, 
p. 106, and compare H.L.A. HART, Jherina's Heaven of Concepts and 
Modern Analytical Jurisprudence. in idem. Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy, cit., pp. 274-275. See I. KANT, Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft. B 171 ff., and idem. Kritik der Urteilskraft■ 
Introduction, and see e.g. L. WITTGENSTEIN, The Blue Book, cit., 
p. 33, and L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophische Untersuchunaen. cit., 
p. 58 (I, 68: "There is, for instance, no rule about how high one 
can throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game 




























































































meta-rule; we need criteria for applying the rule which are not 
regulated, such as prudential considerations or - as Klaus 
Gunther suggests - Anaemessenheitskriterien■ criteria of 
appropriateness103. Consider Gustavo Zagrebelsky's following 
thought on the relation between law and its application to 
specific cases: "The written law in statutes serves to give cases 
the rule appropriate to them. But what that consists in is not 
in the exclusive power of legislative law to determine"104. The 
rule does not regulate its application nor guarantee against its 
abuse, nor can it by itself prevent its own breach. As Giacomo 
Leopardi says, "abuse and disobedience of the law cannot be 
prevented by any law"105.
All this has as a consequence that the specific form of an 
"institution" cannot be fully determined by its constitutive 
norms or rules. The constitutive norms in fact do not by 
themselves constitute the object they deal with, but constitute 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the constitution of 
their object. An "institution" is constituted only if there are 
specific actions that confer, so to speak, "intention", that is, 
utilize, the constitutive norms. What I call "institution" is 
thus not formally closed, but keeps an open structure, an "open 
texture"106.
However, this "open texture" has to be filled with content, or 
specified in specific contexts. This comes about in each case in 
a different way, since the context considered is different. Here 
we come up against one of the motors of transformation of law, 
since each application of the rule, each action carried out
103 See K. GUNTHER, Per Sinn für Anaemessenheit. Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main 1988, pp. 311 ff., and cf. E. TUGENDHAT, Fragen 
der Ethik. Reclam, Stuttgart 1984, pp. 39 ff.
104 G. ZAGREBELSKY, Il diritto mite. Legge. diritti, 
giustizia■ Einaudi, Torino 1992, p. 186.
105 G. LEOPARDI, Zibaldone. 229.
106 Cf. C. CASTORIADIS, L'institution imaginaire de la 




























































































within the framework of the institution, alters (sometimes only 
minimally) the institution itself.
Wittgenstein, in his last works, sketches out a distinction 
between (i) rules that we might call "subsumptive", whose sphere 
of application is predetermined, and (ii) rules we might call 
"productive", whose sphere of application is not predetermined. 
Better, as far as "subsumptive" rules are concerned, their 
meaning or semantic content is not influenced by their 
individual, specific applications. In the case of "productive" 
or "creative" rules, their meaning or semantic content depends 
on their individual, specific applications107.
One of the important implications of the distinction between 
"subsumptive" and "creative" rules is that the former are not 
altered or changed by their application, while the latter are. 
The latter, the "creative" rules, undoubtedly include the 
constitutive rules of institutions. One of the motors for the
107 This difference between "subsumptive" and "creative" 
rules in the later Wittgenstein has been acutely stressed by 
Stephen Korner with explicit reference to legal norms. "The 
philosopher," writes Korner, "as seen by Wittgenstein, must above 
all avoid the scientific view of the relation between a general 
rule and its individual cases of application. For while the 
average scientist assumes that the meaning of his rules remains 
unaffected by their application to individual cases, Wittgenstein 
asserts that the meaning of every rule is to some extent 
dependent on the cases to which it is applied. Were that not so, 
the 'interpretation of the rule, and its outcome, would be left 
hanging in the air'. It seems useful in this context to 
distinguish between two types of rule, namely 'subsumptive 
rules', whose scope of application is fully determined by their 
application to individual cases, and 'creative rules' whose scope 
of application is in (at least) some cases determined in the 
course of application. That creative rules exist is a commonplace 
of legal practice and legal theory. Thus, a rule applied in the 
light of cases judged earlier can in turn become a leading 
precedent for its later interpretation, thereby revealing 'the 
creative element in legal proceedings'. Wittgenstein is convinced 
not only that there are creative rules, but that many rules (for 
instance mathematical ones, that are normally regarded as 
subsumptive are in fact creative" (St. KORNER, Uber Sprachspiele 
und rechtliche Institutionen■ in Ethik. Grundlaaen. Probleme und 
Anwendunaen. ed. by E. Morscher and R. Stranzinger, Holder- 




























































































transformation of law (an institution founded on constitutive 
rules) is just the fact that the rules it is made up of change 
through their application. The applications of the rules have 
repercussions on their semantic content, which in turn obviously 
has repercussions on subsequent applications of the rules.
These transformations of law cannot be explained through the 
notion of "evolution", at least not through the "strong" notion 
of evolution loaded with a causalist, finalist Weltanschauuna. 
Both, causalism and finalism, exclude the emergence of new 
realities like those of "institutions". "If," writes Castoriadis, 
"this succession is determined, or necessary, it is given with 
the law and its first term"108. As far as the law is concerned, 
there is no possibility of causally or finalistically deriving 
a rule from a particular situation of fact, and from this a 
particular application of it. Among constitutive rules, their 
precedents (other constitutive rules), the sphere of action they 
make possible and finally the factual actions carried out, there 
are multiple, complex relations that cannot be explained on a 
finalist or causalist model. Accordingly, as Hubert Rottleuthner 
writes, "a theory of legal development should be sensitive to 
breaks, discontinuities, degressions and regressions"109.
The critique of the "evolution of law" paradigm does not mean 
denying the temporal dimension nor concealing the transformations 
in rules, institutions and law. My conclusion is not some dream 
of universality or eternity, nor the bogey of a natural law valid 
semper et ubiaue. Nor does my criticism of the concept of 
evolution as applied to human societies and to law imply a desire 
to return to an Aristotelian metaphysics of immutable 
"substances". Nor do I think that endeavours to establish causal 
connections deserve contempt, as far as the many transformations
108 C. CASTORIADIS, OP.cit.■ p. 236.
109 H. ROTTLEUTHNER, Legal Evolution and the Limits of Law, 
in Law. Morality and Discursive Rationality, ed. by A. Aarnio and 
K. Tuori, Publications of the Department of Public Law, 




























































































of law are concerned.
The message of these notes is fairly simple, and perhaps 
disillusionary: one should not have any confidence in theories 
too loaded with metaphysical assumptions. In any case, if we need 
a metaphysics, and I think we do, I prefer one that will not and 
cannot, in Heinrich Heine's words, "stopfen die Liicken des 
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